United Nations S/2001/16

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 5 January 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 5 January 2001, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-20507 (E) 080101

Annex

Letter dated 5 January 2001 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the monthly report on operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). I would appreciate your making the report available to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) George **Robertson**

Enclosure

Monthly report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR)

1. Over the reporting period (13 November-12 December), there were approximately 22,000 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all the NATO allies and from 15 non-NATO countries. Troops of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) continued to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations by means of ground and air patrols. Other operations included area security, monitoring the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, monitoring the Entity Armed Forces (EAF), conducting weapons storage site inspections, providing support to the international organizations in theatre and collecting weapons and ammunition in the framework of Operation Harvest.

2. SFOR support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the supervision of the 11 November elections ended on 30 November. During this last phase of its support operation, SFOR delivered ballots to counting centres and assisted civil authorities in ensuring a safe and secure environment following the announcement of the election results.

3. Between 2 and 9 December, SFOR conducted Operation Joint Resolve 21, which involved units from all three Multinational Divisions (MNDs), the Operational Reserve and the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU). The aim of the exercise was to demonstrate SFOR's enhanced capability in dealing with the full spectrum of civil disorder operations.

4. On 24 November, SFOR troops in MND (South East) discovered an estimated 66 tons of cyanide and an unknown amount of sodium solution in the town of Hrasnica. The site was secured on 25 November.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

5. The situation in theatre remained calm and stable throughout the reporting period, with the entities in substantial compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement.

6. Over the period, SFOR troops conducted 154 weapons storage site inspections. No violations were reported.

7. SFOR troops monitored 369 training and movement activities: 140 Bosnian Serb; 74 Bosniac; 19 Bosnian Croat; and 136 Federation.

8. Over the period, EAF demining teams conducted a total of 164 mine-clearing activities.

Cooperation with international organizations

9. Within capabilities and in accordance with its mandate, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, including the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Police Task Force, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OSCE and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

10. SFOR continues to support OHR in its efforts to establish common institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the 8 December meeting of the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), it was decided that the target date for the completion of the 15 per cent reduction of the EAF could slip from 31 December 2000 to 31 January 2001. In early 2001, SFOR will begin the development of a joint SFOR-EAF training and exercise plan. The SCMM also agreed on plans for the expansion of the SCMM secretariat and indicated that it would consider the draft defence policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and future EAF restructuring in January 2001.

11. SFOR continues to cooperate with the UNCHR's Returns and Reconstruction Task Force and is also supporting Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) settlements and evictions. DPRE return trends continue to mirror those of 1999. Between January and October 2000, minority returns increased by more than 12 per cent compared to 1999. With the onset of winter, the return process is slowing down, as expected.

Outlook

12. Isolated incidents of violence can be expected, mainly in connection with the return of refugees and displaced persons.

United Nations S/2001/17

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 5 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I should like to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 4 January 2001 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning a request for the deportation from Iraq of the Kenyan officer Major Joseph Chelule, who works in the Baghdad liaison office of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Al-Humaimidi**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

01-20501 (E) 090101 090101

Annex to the letter dated 5 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have previously drawn attention on numerous occasions to the infractions committed by United Nations staff members working in Iraq, taking advantage in the commission of these repeated infractions of the immunities and privileges granted them as staff members working under the auspices of the international Organization.

In this instance I should like to inform you that another case is added to the numerous previous infractions, inasmuch as this time Major Joseph Chelule, of Kenyan nationality, who works in the Baghdad liaison office of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), was apprehended as he was crossing the Iraqi border to Kuwait on 10 December 2000 with 50 (fifty) bottles of whiskey in his possession which he intended to smuggle into Kuwait. Major Chelule hid those bottles in the UNIKOM vehicle bearing plate No. UNIKOM/272, a Toyota bus. Following this act, he was summoned to the Iraqi liaison office in the town of Umm Qasr, the smuggled goods were unloaded from the vehicle, and he confessed his attempt to smuggle the items.

This incident and the many other repeated incidents prove that United Nations staff members are exploiting their capacity as international civil servants by taking advantage of United Nations cover to engage in practices that they are fully aware are clearly and unequivocally prohibited by the provisions of Iraqi law.

The action of the officer Joseph Chelule constitutes a breach of his mandate as an international civil servant and a violation of the provisions of Iraqi law.

Accordingly, I request you to withdraw this staff member from Iraq and to terminate his employment with UNIKOM.

(*Signed*) Mohammed Said **Al-Sahaf**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq

United Nations S/2001/18

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 5 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 4 January 2001 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the ongoing wanton aggression against Iraq by United States and British aircraft in the unlawful no-flight zones and to the fact that in the period from 24 to 31 December 2000 they carried out 213 sorties, 119 of them from Saudi Arabia, 78 from Kuwait and 16 from Turkey.

The Minister reaffirms the Government of Iraq's condemnation of these acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, and he states that international responsibility for them must be borne by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the logistic support for this aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. He urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter by halting this unwarranted aggression and ensuring that it does not recur.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Al-Humaimidi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-20514 (E) 090101 090101

Annex to the letter dated 5 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey have continued to violate the airspace of the Republic of Iraq. They carried out 213 sorties in the period from 24 to 31 December 2000, 119 of them from Saudi Arabia, 78 from Kuwait and 16 from Turkey, as shown hereunder.

1. In the northern region 16 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1105 hours on 18 [i.e. 24?] December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1400 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 197 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1030 hours on 25 December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 22 missions, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 12 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Hayy, Shinafiyah, Rumaythah and Nukhayb areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1230 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1155 hours on 26 December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 20 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and eight from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Jalibah, Nasiriyah, Busayyah, Shatrah, Amarah, Qurnah and Shinafiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1350 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1015 hours on 27 December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 38 missions, 30 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and eight from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Jalibah, Nasiriyah, Shinafiyah, Basrah, Lasaf, Najaf, Samawah, Qal'at Sukkar, Diwaniyah, Nukhayb, Hayy, Talhah and Nu'maniyah areas. Our air

defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1405 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1203 hours on 28 December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 45 missions, 23 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 22 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah South, Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Hayy, Afak, Taqtaqanah, Diwaniyah, Hashimiyah and Najaf areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2005 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1018 hours on 29 December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 22 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 10 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Amarah, Qurnah, Jalibah, Diwaniyah, Rifa'i, Shinafiyah, Lasaf, Qal'at Salih, Najaf and Ukhaydir areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2100 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1830 hours on 30 December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 24 missions, 20 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and four from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shinafiyah, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Qurnah, Rifa'i and Salman areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1945 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1455 hours on 31 December 2000, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 26 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 14 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah, Jalibah, Ashbajah, Rumaythah, Qurnah, Lasaf, Salman, Umm Qasr, Artawi, Basrah, Samawah, Rifa'i, Shatrah, Shinafiyah, Najaf, Diwaniyah and Qal'at Salih areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1625 hours, drove them off.

This aggression illustrates the bellicose attitude being maintained by the United States of America and the United Kingdom towards Iraq. Since 1992, it has become a fixed policy aimed at undermining the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and at the systematic and concerted destruction of Iraqi lives, infrastructure and civilian installations. It is a policy that has been affirmed in successive statements made by United States and British officials seeking to defend the measures being taken to enforce the no-flight zones.

The Government of Iraq categorically rejects the two so-called no-flight zones, which were imposed by unilateral decision of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and lack any legal basis. Iraq rejects all the consequences of this illegal decision and, in particular, the flimsy excuses and pretexts used by these States in an attempt to justify their military aggression against our country.

The logistic support provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey to the Americans and the British has made these countries key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they bear full international responsibility under international law. This includes liability for full compensation for the loss and damage, in both human and material terms, that is caused by these illegal practices.

The Government of Iraq further renews its call to the countries participating in this aggression to desist forthwith from internationally prohibited acts that violate Iraq's sovereignty, place its security and integrity in grave danger and pose a direct and serious threat to international peace and security.

As it condemns these acts of aggression against civilian targets and Iraqi civilian installations, the Government of Iraq urges you to intervene with the governments of the countries in question with a view to inducing them to halt, end and desist from any resumption of their constant and unwarranted aggression against an independent, sovereign State.

(*Signed*) Mohammed Said **Al-Sahaf**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq

United Nations S/2001/19

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The question of whether there is stability or instability in Somalia concerns Ethiopia only second to the people of the sisterly country itself. Unlike many from afar, we share a border of over 2,000 kilometres with Somalia. Tens of thousands of refugees from Somalia are still in Ethiopia. Holders of Somalia passports are freely allowed to enter the country without restrictions. More than any other country, except Somalia, Ethiopia will be the greatest beneficiary from a stable and peaceful Somalia. Likewise, it will be adversely affected, as has been the case for the past 10 years, when there is no peace in that country. At this juncture, allow me to restate in part what Ethiopia's Foreign Minister, H.E. Mr. Seyoum Mesfin said at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly in addressing the issue of peace and reconciliation in Somalia:

> "It is Ethiopia's hope that what has already been achieved in Djibouti will be built upon and that the momentum for peace and national reconciliation will be maintained ... The opportunity now created in Somalia should not be allowed to slip away. This could easily happen if all attention is focused on seeking international legitimacy rather than internal national reconciliation. It would indeed be a tragedy and a recipe for further bloodshed in Somalia if an effort is not made to build on the peace and stability that has already been achieved by some regions and parts of Somalia. The issue of Somaliland, for instance, requires great sensitivity and a sense of enormous responsibility. Whatever has been achieved in Djibouti is going to be tested by how well the peace and stability that some parts of Somalia have achieved, is preserved."

In connection with this matter, I have the pleasure of attaching a note verbale of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia addressed to the General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity. I would be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Abdulmejid **Hussein**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-20566 (E) 080101

Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia presents its compliments to the General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity and has the honour pursuant to the latter's Notes of 8 and 30 November 2000, to communicate the following.

As has been indicated in the Note by the General Secretariat of 30 November, the 8th IGAD Summit convened in Khartoum on 23rd November 2000 has adopted a resolution on Somalia which has relevance for the OAU.

It is the conviction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia that the said resolution is very realistic and faithful to the real situation in Somalia and therefore a document which the General Secretariat should bring to the attention of member states in full.

The following are the core elements of this IGAD Summit resolution:

- That the Arta Peace Conference constituted a major achievement in the Somali peace process.
- A call both on the Transitional Government and all parties and administrations in Somalia to create the environment for the inclusion of all in the peace process so that the opportunity for national reconciliation could be widened.
- Insistence that the peace process in Somalia must continue and be completed through dialogue and not by resorting to the use of force.

- An affirmation of the need for all necessary measures to be taken to ensure that the territory of Somalia will not be used as a springboard by groups inimical to the peace and security of the Sub-region.

- Reiteration and affirmation of IGAD's commitment to the Unity and territorial integrity of Somalia.

The 8th IGAD Summit resolution then in operative paragraphs 7 and 8 lays out the following which Ethiopia hopes the General Secretariat and members states would appreciate in their full meaning:

- Welcomes the participation of the Transitional Government of Somalia in the deliberation and activities of IGAD, bearing in mind that regular and continuing evaluation of progress towards peace and national reconciliation in the country will be carried out (operative Paragraph 7)

- Urgently call upon the international community to support the rehabilitation in Somalia through direct assistance to the Transitional Government and the regions which had established peace and stability through self administration, as long as they are committed to the peace process (Operative Paragraph 8).

This IGAD summit resolution whose central themes have been laid out above is based on careful consideration of a number of fundamental issues which can be outlined as follow:

- Recognition of the achievement of the Arta Conference and of the potential possibilities that have been created for full national reconciliation in Somalia.

- Recognition of the still existing complex difficulties in Somalia for national reconciliation and of the complex nature of the situation on the ground.

- Determination not to exacerbate the situation in Somalia by implicit legitimization of the use of force as a means of completing the process of the formation of a broad-based government in Somalia.

- Acknowledgment that there are administrations in Somalia which have managed to bring about peace and stability to some areas and that these should not be belittled and ignored and that doing so will have adverse implications.

It is the conviction of the Ministry that the General Secretariat will, in its reports and communications on Somalia, take into account what has been elaborated in the foregoing.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity the assurances of its highest consideration.

United Nations S/2001/20

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to forward to Your Excellency a copy of the letter dated 8 January 2001 from H.E. President Isaias Afwerki addressed to Secretary-General Kofi Annan (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Haile **Menkerios**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-20572 (E) 090101

Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you to express my Government's indignation at Ethiopia's preposterous allegation (letter of the Prime Minister of 4 January (S/2001/11, annex)) accusing Eritrea of "wanting to renegotiate the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities" that both countries signed in Algiers on 18 June last year.

Let me reiterate from the outset — and the track record is clear — that Eritrea remains fully committed to the scrupulous implementation of all the agreements that it has signed. As I underlined during the signing ceremony of the Peace Agreement on 12 December 2000, Eritrea is indeed prepared to forget the past and look to a future of peace that will rekindle the hope of neighbourly cooperation and coexistence between the two countries on the basis of mutual respect of each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It is true that the Military Coordination Commission did not reach an agreement on the establishment of the temporary security zone during its meeting in Nairobi on 28 December. But responsibility for this unnecessary obstruction rests squarely on Ethiopia.

Under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Ethiopia is required to submit to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) a redeployment plan of its troops to positions held before 6 May 1998. Paragraph 10 of the Agreement makes it clear that this is a temporary arrangement which "will not prejudge the final status of the contested areas, which shall be determined at the end of the delimitation and demarcation of the border".

But these provisions, temporary as they are, do not give Ethiopia carte blanche to draw an arbitrary line. Ethiopia is expected, and indeed required, to act in good faith and submit a redeployment plan that reflects the positions it held as well as the positions that Eritrea held before 6 May 1998.

It is unfortunate that the redeployment proposal that Ethiopia submitted at the Military Coordination Commission meeting in Nairobi contained manifest and demonstrable misrepresentations of positions on the ground. Ethiopia has in fact demanded, in its redeployment plan, that it be allowed to militarily occupy sovereign Eritrean territories in which Ethiopia had never so much as set foot. In the event, Eritrea had no choice but to object to Ethiopia's redeployment plan as it constituted a violation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in addition to its grave humanitarian implications for the return of hundreds of thousands of Eritreans displaced by the war. Yet Eritrea opted for a constructive stance of redressing the issue through the good offices of your Special Representative, while Ethiopia has resorted to provocative statements and threats.

Eritrea views Ethiopia's provocative statements, particularly its threat to indefinitely delay the redeployment of its forces from occupied Eritrean territories, as a clear violation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Ethiopia must be made to realize that its unwarranted position would entail consequences in accordance with paragraph 14 of the Agreement, which provides for "measures to be taken by the international community should one or both of the Parties violate this

commitment, including appropriate measures to be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by the United Nations Security Council".

The humanitarian implications of Ethiopia's demands cannot be underestimated. Ethiopia's request to occupy territories in which it did not have any presence before the outbreak of the conflict would mean denying the right of return to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Eritreans.

In this respect, Ethiopia is already guilty of a gross violation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement as well as the 1949 Geneva Conventions by its behaviour in the occupied territories, which continues to escalate by the day, even after the signature of the comprehensive Peace Agreement of 12 December 2000. Ethiopia has, in recent weeks, carried out senseless looting, burning and destruction of whole villages in the occupied territories. Eritrea has duly brought these gross violations to the attention of the office of your Special Representative.

(*Signed*) Isaias **Afwerki**
President
The State of Eritrea

United Nations S/2001/21

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We are currently seeing another resurgence of United Nations peacekeeping operations. This would therefore be an appropriate moment to review measures that could be taken to strengthen their effectiveness. The report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), established by you, has generated significant momentum towards the achievement of this goal. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have endorsed various recommendations of the Security Council working group and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the Panel's report.

One issue that surfaced was the clearly felt need for greater consultation between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat. However, more could be done in this area. We should consider going beyond closer consultation to strengthening cooperation between the three partners.

I am therefore pleased to inform you that an open debate on strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries will be organized by Singapore during its Presidency of the Security Council in January 2001. We wish to encourage the troop-contributing countries and other Members States to take this opportunity to share their experience, present their views and contribute constructive and useful suggestions to the discussion. We hope that as a result of this exercise some concrete recommendations will emerge.

I am also pleased to enclose two papers on this subject (see annex and enclosure). The papers provide background to the issue as well as suggesting some specific questions that could be addressed by participants in the open debate. I hope that the Member States and the Secretariat will find the papers useful in preparing for the debate.

I would appreciate it if the present letter, its annex and enclosure could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kishore **Mahbubani**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

01-20560 (E) 090101

Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries

Introduction

1. After a steady decline in United Nations peacekeeping activities in recent years, United Nations peacekeeping is once again seeing resurgence. New United Nations peacekeeping operations have been deployed in Sierra Leone (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)) and Ethiopia and Eritrea (United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)). Another, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)), awaits full deployment. The number of troops, military observers and civilian police personnel has risen to about 40,000 from approximately 15,000 a year ago. More peacekeepers are expected to be deployed in 2001. Some United Nations peacekeeping operations have also expanded significantly in scope. Complex, multidisciplinary United Nations peacekeeping missions in the form of interim administrations are in place in Kosovo (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)) and East Timor (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)).

2. However, in the midst of this resurgence, United Nations peacekeeping suffered a serious setback when several hundred UNAMSIL troops were detained by Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) rebels in May 2000. An assessment team despatched by the Secretary-General to Sierra Leone concluded that there were many reasons for this setback. One reason, which again came to the fore was lack of cooperation and consultation between the United Nations Security Council and the troop-contributing countries. This is déjà vu. Having witnessed how similar problems plagued the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Balkans and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in Somalia, and determined not to repeat the same mistakes, efforts were made in the early 1990s which led to concrete steps being taken to improve cooperation and coordination between troop-contributing countries and the Security Council. These were enshrined in two presidential statements (S/PRST/1994/62 dated 4 November 1994 and S/PRST/1996/13 dated 28 March 1996).

3. Significantly, in the latter presidential statement on enhancing consultations among troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat (S/PRST/1996/13), the Council stated that "the Security Council will continue to keep arrangements for consultations and the exchange of information and views with troop contributors and prospective contributors under review and stands ready to consider further measures and new mechanisms to enhance further the arrangements in the light of experience." Against the backdrop of the recent experiences of United Nations peacekeeping operations and in order to build upon the momentum to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations in the peacekeeping field generated by the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 21 August 2000 (the "Brahimi report" A/55/305-S/2000/809), it is perhaps time for the Council to undertake such a consideration.

Recent efforts to enhance cooperation with troop-contributing countries

4. The issue of cooperation between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries was addressed by the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, including the link between the commitment gaps in the provision of troops for United Nations peacekeeping operations and the need for better coordination and consultation between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat. In his report on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, issued on 20 October 2000 (A/55/502), the Secretary-General reiterated this need. The issue was also referred to by many delegations during the Fourth Committee general debate on the "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects" from 8 to 10 November 2000, during the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Both the Security Council (resolution 1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000) and the General Assembly (resolution 55/135 of 8 December 2000) adopted resolutions endorsing the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations on strengthening consultations between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

5. Significantly, in its resolution 1327 (2000), the Security Council stated its commitment to hold private meetings with the troop-contributing countries at various stages of the establishment and implementation of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Under this arrangement, the Council would meet the troop-contributing countries directly with the Secretariat. This is potentially a significant improvement over the meetings with troop-contributing countries established by the Security Council via S/PRST/1996/13, in which the meetings were in substance between the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries, although they were chaired by the President of the Security Council.

6. Interestingly, even before resolution 1327 (2000) was adopted, a private meeting was held with the troop contributors to UNAMSIL, on 4 October 2000, to seek their views before the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone, led by Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, travelled to Sierra Leone. Many troop-contributing countries found the meeting to be very useful, especially since it was an interactive meeting. It would seem that in committing to hold private meetings with troop-contributing countries in resolution 1327 (2000), the Council decided to formalize such a meeting format. This view was supported by the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, at the Security Council formal meeting to adopt resolution 1327 (2000), at which he stated that it was the understanding of the Council that such meetings would be in the format of the 4 October 2000 meeting on UNAMSIL. These consultations, whatever the provisions of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, should be neither traditional troop-contributor meetings nor private formal meetings in the Council Chamber. Rather, they should be in a format that allows a free exchange of views between Council members and the troop-contributing countries, and they should include the necessary substantive briefings.

Security Council open debate on strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries on 16 January 2001

7. The Security Council open debate on strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries on 16 January 2001, which will be held during Singapore's Presidency of the Council, is intended to provide an opportunity for United Nations Member States to discuss and give their views on fostering a new spirit of cooperation between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat. Much effort has been spent in the last decade to fortify this cooperation, which is a cornerstone of United Nations peacekeeping activities. However, more can be done. In this regard, the open debate on 16 January 2001 would be an opportunity for Member States to address the following key questions.

(a) Conduct of meetings with troop-contributing countries

It should be acknowledged that a step forward was made in formalizing a process of consultations between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries through the establishment of the meetings between them. Many of the guidelines for meetings of troop-contributing countries established by S/PRST/1994/62 and S/PRST/1996/13 continue to be valid and if these guidelines had been implemented fully, not just in form, but more importantly in spirit, these meetings had the potential of becoming the principal process for cooperation and coordination between the Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries on peacekeeping matters. Unfortunately, in practice, the meetings have become pro forma and ritualistic and have fallen short of the expectations of the troop-contributing countries. How could we therefore improve the content and form of private meetings with troop-contributing countries to make them more interactive and productive?

(b) Strengthening the link between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries in peacekeeping

In addition to meetings, what other mechanisms can be used to strengthen the link between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries in peacekeeping? In a Security Council open debate on "No exit without strategy" on 15 November 2000, Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock commented that he thought that the Brahimi report covers a lot of what we want. I am not sure that we do not need a special subcommittee of the Council on peacekeeping operations to take up some of these professional and detailed points. It may be useful to hear the views of Member States on his suggestion.

(c) Cooperation between the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat in addressing problems in peacekeeping

Participants may also wish to suggest how the relationship with troop-contributing countries can go beyond consultations to real cooperation between the three crucial partners in United Nations peacekeeping. In this connection, we may need to address the commitment gaps in the contribution of troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations, the previous failures and shortcomings of United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the problems concerning the safety and security of the United Nations peacekeepers. How can the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat cooperate to tackle these problems?

8. We have no preconceived notions of the likely desirable outcomes of this open debate. Its main purpose is to provide all participants in United Nations peacekeeping an opportunity to reflect on recent experiences, with a view to distilling some lessons that can be learnt. We hope that as a result of this exercise, some concrete recommendations will emerge that will lead to a better relationship between the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat, and to a new spirit of cooperation among the three partners.

Enclosure

Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries — Background

Early 1990s

1. In their book, *The Procedure of the United Nations Security Council, Third Edition*, Bailey and Daws gave the following account of what transpired on the issue of consultations between the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat in the early 1990s:

> The significant increase in the cost of peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s, for which all Member States were liable, coupled with the transition in some operations from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, with attendant greater risk for peacekeeping participants, led to calls from non-members of the Council for a greater input into decision-making on peacekeeping.
>
> In May 1993, at the initiative of the Secretary-General, the 'first meeting of troop contributors' took place, in connection with the United Nations Protection Force. Such meetings increased in frequency, but did not satisfy all the concerns of non-members.
>
> In May 1994, the Council acknowledged 'the need for enhanced consultations and exchange of information with troop-contributing countries, regarding peacekeeping operations including their planning, management and coordination'. Following this statement, the Council made some contentious decisions on changes to the mandates of ongoing peacekeeping operations. Many troop-contributing countries felt that this showed that existing methods of consultation were fine for information sharing but inadequate when a question of change to an operation's mandate was involved. Specific criticisms were that consultations had not been held 'in good time', that inadequate background information had been supplied, and that there was little indication that anything said by non-members would influence subsequent decisions of the Council.
>
> Reflecting these concerns, Argentina and New Zealand requested that the President of the Council call a meeting to consider procedural questions concerning the operation of the Council in this area. The two countries believed that an institutionalisation of consultation mechanisms was desirable and suggested the convening of a standing committee of the Council to review regularly reports on peacekeeping missions and to provide for consultations with non-members. A number of other States wrote letters to the President endorsing the concerns of Argentina and New Zealand. Egypt pointed out that the overwhelming majority of United Nations peacekeeping forces and observers came from States not members of the Council. Egypt endorsed the proposal that the Council establish a subsidiary organ for the purpose of consultations, under the provisions of Article 29[1] of the United Nations

[1] "The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its function."

Charter. It also argued that the Council should apply the spirit of Article 44[2] of the United Nations Charter. Austria supported efforts to include potential as well as actual troop-contributing countries in consultations between the Secretariat and the Council prior to the deployment of a new operation.

The Council duly met on 4 November 1994 and issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/62) setting out procedures for consultations between members of the Security Council, troop-contributing countries, and the Secretariat. It stated that such consultations should be held 'in good time' with an informal background paper circulated well in advance; that they would be chaired jointly by the Presidency of the Council and a Secretariat representative; and would be listed in the United Nations Journal and the monthly forecast of Council work. A number of Council members felt that setting up a subsidiary organ for the purpose of undertaking consultations would reduce Council efficiency, and such a proposal was not included in the statement.

In the debate following the adoption of the statement, there was widespread support for the measures introduced. ... Some delegations, however, argued that further steps needed to be taken. Malaysia referred to a paper entitled "Political Direction and Support" produced by non-permanent members and troop-contributing countries. These States presented a detailed list of situations for which consultations should be called:

> ... when the mandate of a new peacekeeping operation was being formulated; when the concept and/or plan of operation of a peacekeeping operation was being considered; when the extension of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation was being considered; when a substantive modification of the mandate of an existing peacekeeping operation, including the broadening or narrowing of its geographical scope, changes in rules of engagement, introduction of new functions or components and so forth, was being considered; when significant developments occurred which, in the opinion of the Secretary-General, or members of the Security Council or of troop-contributing countries, were likely to affect materially the functioning of the operation or its ability to fulfil its mandate; or when the withdrawal of the operation in whole or in part was being considered.

In 1995, a new report by the Secretary-General, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations" was published. On 22 February 1995, the members of the Council issued a statement (S/PRST/1995/9) in response to 'the Supplement' addressing issues such as conflict prevention, the economic and social roots of conflict, peacekeeping, disarmament, economic sanctions, and the role of regional organisations. The debate following the issuing of "the Supplement" also brought more widespread calls from States for the "institutionalisation" of consultations, and a subsidiary organ to include troop-contributing countries.

---

[2] "When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of the Member's armed forces."

These calls were repeated in a Council meeting on 20 December 1995 called explicitly to consider improvements to such consultations. The meeting demonstrated a clear division between four of the permanent members (France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) who recognized failings in the present arrangements but who sought 'pragmatic' changes as a remedy, and thirty six troop-contributing countries who had been meeting informally, and who proposed the formal establishment of a subsidiary body. China's statement was neutral. As a result of this debate, and considerable further negotiation informally, the Council in a further presidential statement on 28 March 1996 (S/PRST/1996/13) set out further measures to strengthen consultations. The measures adopted were closer to those suggested by the permanent members than by other troop-contributing countries, in that they did not go much further toward the institutionalization of such meetings. The statement announced that meetings with troop-contributing countries would be chaired primarily by the Presidency of the Council, with support from a Secretariat representative, rather than jointly as before; that meetings would be held with prospective contributors before the establishment of a new peacekeeping operation, and that information about meetings with troop-contributing countries would be appended to the Council's annual report to the General Assembly. Some Council members notified the President of the Council that they had refrained from breaking the consensus necessary for the adoption of a presidential statement, but that they wished the Council to revisit the matter so that the de jure as well as de facto right of troop-contributing countries to express their views could be recognised by the Council. Egypt noted that the presidential statement was in the right direction since it stipulated that

> the Security Council recalls that the arrangements described above are not exhaustive. They do not preclude consultations in a variety of forms, including informal communication between the Council President or its members and troop-contributing countries and, as appropriate, with other countries especially affected, for example, countries from the region concerned and that the Security Council will continue to keep arrangements for consultations and the exchange of information and views with troop-contributing countries and prospective troop-contributing countries under review and stands ready to consider further measures and new mechanisms to enhance further the arrangements in the light of experience.

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and thereafter

2. Not long after the problems experienced by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the issue of consultations between the troop-contributing countries and the Security Council was addressed by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi in its report of 21 August 2000. Under the section entitled "Clear, credible and achievable mandates", the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations linked the commitment gaps in the provision of troops for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to the

need for better coordination and consultation between the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat. It stated that:

> "There are several ways to diminish the likelihood of such commitment gaps, including better coordination and consultation between potential troop-contributors and the members of the Security Council during the mandate formulation process. Troop-contributor advice to the Security Council might usefully be institutionalized via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Member States contributing formed military units to an operation should as a matter of course be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of the mission's personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of a mission's mandate with respect to the use of force."

The Report went on to recommend the following:

> "... countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission's use of force".

3. In his report on the implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 20 October 2000 (A/55/502), the Secretary-General supported the Panel's views on consultations between the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat, stating the following:

> "Troop contributors will have an important role to play, because it is their military contingents who will be called upon to discharge their responsibilities professionally, in accordance with the mission mandates, the rules of engagement, and consistent with the long-established principle of 'unity of command'.
>
> "I therefore wholeheartedly concur with the Panel's assessment that closer consultation between troop contributors and the Security Council, including through new mechanisms and procedures, is needed (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 61). This would help to ensure that the contributors were fully aware of what was expected of them before they deployed personnel to the field, as well as during volatile situations ..."

4. The issue of consultations between the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat was raised during the Fourth Committee general debate on the "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects" from 8 to 10 November 2000, during the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Describing the Secretariat's place in the linkage, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, made the following statement:

> While it is not for the Secretariat to decide on the mandates, it is its responsibility to fully inform the Security Council and troop contributing of the implications of a particular mandate, to provide a frank appraisal of whether a proposed mandate is sufficiently clear and to provide a clear assessment of the resources required to implement the mandate and ensure the safety and security of our peacekeepers.

> On a broader level, a frank exchange of information must continue beyond the initial stages of mandate formulation. There is a need for strengthened dialogue and consultations between the Secretariat, the Security Council and troop and police contributors throughout the life of a mission in order to enable all parties concerned to make informed decisions on all aspects of an operation.
>
> Such dialogue is what helps maintain the trust required for Member States to be willing to provide the resources needed and to assume the risks entailed in deploying peacekeepers, as the Special Committee has stressed in its report.
>
> At Headquarters, in particular, we must explain to contributors the risks involved in an operation and the way we plan to address them. I plan to make myself, and my senior experts, including the military and civilian police advisers, available to provide even more frequent and comprehensive briefings for this purpose. This will enable us to not only share our assessments and plans, but also to listen to your own concerns and expectations, so that we can adequately respond to them.

5. In the same Fourth Committee general debate, speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, made the following statement:

> The Council, too, should involve the troop contributors in the process of consultations, in a manner that is institutional and meaningful; one which comes into being at the earliest stages of drawing up an operation, and which persists until the termination of the operation. Unless members of the Security Council, and in particular the permanent members and those with obvious capabilities, decide themselves to meet the troop levels they mandate and to do it all themselves for the operations, particularly dangerous operations, they mandate, then a deeper sense of mutual trust must be cultivated between those who design and those who implement. It is a partnership that, in the case of UNAMSIL and numerous operations before it, has been noticeably absent. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has stressed for some time that whenever the use of force is contemplated, the Council should adhere to Articles 43 and 44 of the United Nations Charter. We therefore welcome the virtually identical comments made by the Under-Secretary-General on the topic of consultations in his presentation.

6. The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, Ambassador Kamalesh Sharma, in his statement during the same Fourth Committee general debate, linked the withdrawal of troops by the troop contributors to the lack of consultations between them and the Security Council. He said that:

> ... In the preparation of a peacekeeping operation's tasks and in the evolution of its mandate, the Security Council and the Secretariat must consult closely with the troop contributors, taking their advice into account. The continuing crisis in UNAMSIL illustrates why this is essential. The troop contributors will be increasingly reluctant to put their forces at risk when they are asked to discharge unrealistic tasks and when their advice based on experience gathered on the ground is not sought or not accepted when offered.
>
> There is a further systemic problem, not addressed by the Panel. It encourages the use of force, which the Council can only mandate under Chapter VII.

> Articles 43 and 44 of the Charter, in Chapter VII, lay down that the Security Council shall invite members providing armed forces "to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces". The Charter requires much more than consultations; troop contributors must be able to "participate" in the Council's decisions. The Panel recommends only that troop contributors be more closely consulted, but even on this there is no evidence that the Security Council seriously wishes to go beyond its present procedures, which are completely inadequate. If the Charter provisions are not followed, if the troop contributors are not given a say in the evolution of the Council's mandates, there will be recurring crises when, in exasperation, the troop contributors pull out of operations where their units are forced to take on tasks that either cannot or should not be done.

7. In his statement during the same Fourth Committee general debate, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Ambassador Shamshad Ahmad, said that:

> Success of any peacekeeping operation can be ensured through effective management and coordination by all concerned. One important aspect is consultations between the troop contributors, the Security Council and the Secretariat. The present arrangement is not satisfactory as we all noted during the recent crisis in Sierra Leone. The Brahimi Panel's report highlights this point as well. In this regard, we have proposed the creation of a mission-specific "core group" of troop contributors who, after the establishment of a mission, will actively consult with the Security Council and the Secretariat on all operational matters of the mission. Provision for such consultations is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. This proposal is not geared at supplanting the Charter role of the Security Council but to ensuring greater coordination between the Security Council and troop contributors, on the one hand, and the Secretariat and the troop contributors, on the other. The objective of this proposal is to ensure unity of purpose between the Security Council, the troop contributors and the Secretariat on any given operation.

8. On 13 November 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1327 (2000), which included, inter alia, the following recommendations on consultations with the troop contributors:

> "*Encourages* the Secretary-General to begin his consultations with potential troop contributors well in advance of the establishment of peacekeeping operations, and requests him to report on his consultations during the consideration of new mandates.
>
> "*Underlines* the importance of an improved system of consultations among the troop-contributing countries, the Secretary-General and the Security Council, in order to foster a common understanding of the situation on the ground, of the mission's mandate and of its implementation.
>
> "*Agrees*, in this regard, to strengthen significantly the existing system of consultations through the holding of private meetings with troop-contributing countries, including at their request, and without prejudice to the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, in particular when the Secretary-General has identified potential troop-contributing countries for a new or

ongoing peacekeeping operation, during the implementation phase of an operation, when considering a change in, or renewal or completion of a peacekeeping mandate, or when a rapid deterioration in the situation on the ground threatens the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers".

9. The United Nations General Assembly followed suit on 8 December 2000 by adopting resolution 55/135, endorsing the proposals, recommendations and conclusions of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/C.4/55/6). These included the following recommendations on consultations with the troop contributors under the section "Clear, credible and achievable mandates":

"The Special Committee emphasizes the need for clear, credible and achievable mandates and the necessity for significantly strengthening and formalizing the consultation process between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries in order to make it more meaningful, with due regard to the relevant provisions of the Charter. Such consultations should be held in a timely manner, and may be held at the request of troop-contributing countries, in particular when the Secretary-General has identified potential troop-contributing countries for a new or ongoing peacekeeping operation, and the Security Council is formulating the mandate. Consultations should also be held during the implementation phase of an operation, when considering a change in or renewal or completion of a peacekeeping mandate or when a rapid deterioration in the situation on the ground threatens the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers. Such meetings should, as a general rule, be announced in the *Journal of the United Nations*.

"... Countries that have committed military and civilian police units to an operation should be invited to participate in meetings of the Security Council in which the Secretariat provides it with information on changes to a mission's mandate and concept of operation that have implications for the mission's use of force. While authorising the use of force, the Council should adhere to all relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

"On matters affecting the safety and security of personnel, countries that have committed personnel to an operation should be fully and regularly briefed by the Secretariat. The Special Committee urges that the Secretariat's briefings to troop-contributing countries be timely, comprehensive and professional, and should, as a general rule, be accompanied by written briefs."

United Nations S/2001/22

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2001

Original: English

Report by the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of Ukraine on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 9 January 2001 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations stating that Mr. Yuriy Polurez has been appointed alternate representative of Ukraine on the Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

01-20674 (E) 090101

United Nations S/2001/23

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 9 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The purpose of the present letter is to state clearly why the Security Council must lift the arms embargo it imposed on Ethiopia and Eritrea under resolution 1298 (2000). Ethiopia's opposition to the embargo was made known from the start when the issue was being debated last year. We said at the time: "As a matter of principle, the people of Ethiopia condemn ... this unjust and unfair resolution adopted by the Security Council."

The armed conflict began in May 1998 when Eritrean forces crossed the border and occupied areas under Ethiopian administration. My country appealed to the international community to take action in redressing the aggression. We sent high-level delegations to several countries, many of whom are represented on the Security Council. The aim was to ask them to help us avert a war between the two countries. Some heeded this appeal and did what they could. Others ignored it as simply "another conflict in Africa".

One lesson that the Brahimi report (A/55/305-S/2000/809) drew from the inaction or indecisiveness of the international community was to call a spade a spade. In conflict situations between States and within States, and which pose threats to regional or international security, one must be prepared to put blame where it is due.

Prevarications, especially by the body charged with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", would only encourage those with little respect for international norms of behaviour to continually flout it. Ethiopia has throughout its long history never crossed into another country with the purpose of annexing the territory of others. On the contrary, it was a subject of invasion by countries near and far, small and big. In a historically well-known case, the old league of nations imposed the infamous arms embargo on both Mussolini's Italy and Ethiopia, when the latter was invaded by the former. Turning justice, fairness and logic on its head, an arms embargo was clamped on the aggressor and on the victim of aggression. It was clear whom that action was going to hurt. Mussolini's Italy, which was self-sufficient in armaments, also controlled Eritrea and Somalia — on Ethiopia's northern and south-eastern borders. Ethiopia, with little arms manufacturing capability and landlocked, as today, had its hands totally tied.

01-20668 (E) 090101

The more recent action by the Security Council, while not at the level of that of the League of Nations, is nevertheless the same in principle. It is unjust to deny a country its efforts in defending itself. It flouts the Organization's own Charter to deny a member State the inherent right to defend itself. This is particularly so when the Council shirks its responsibility of taking measures necessary to maintain peace and security. Hence, Ethiopia believes, as it did earlier, that the arms embargo should never have been imposed on it. That action, in all fairness, should have been directed at the aggressor. This was not done. The decent thing to do now is to remove it. Besides, the two countries in their agreement of 12 December 2000 in Algiers (A/55/686-S/2000/1183, annex) have gone beyond what was asked of them under paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of resolution 1298 (2000). The goalposts should not be altered now.

We believe that Security Council members can and should shoulder their responsibilities by giving a boost to confidence in the region as a whole. The lifting of the sanction will be an important symbolic gesture of telling those with good will for the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea, that hope is being restored. Speaking for my country, we have already turned all our efforts to the priority of fighting our main enemy: poverty and backwardness. To date, we have demobilized many thousands of troops and the process is continuing. The military budget has also been drastically reduced. Hence, those who oppose lifting the arms ban must have other motives. It certainly would not be for the sole purpose of stopping an arms buying spree. There are no such intentions on Ethiopia's part. The facts on the ground confirm this. If they believe that they are worried by the other party to the conflict, let them say so and take the appropriate measure. As a question of principle and also based on the fulfilment of the original purpose of the resolution, the arms embargo must be lifted before it lapses.

Under the Algiers agreement of 12 December 2000, demining operations have to be carried out. This is expected to help in bringing back normalcy to the rural communities affected and displaced by the conflict. However, under the current embargo, no country is allowed to offer help to the two countries in removing the tens of thousands of mines in the border regions. I do not believe the Security Council would like to go down in history as having not only prolonged the suffering of the Ethiopian and Eritrean peoples but also contributed to deaths from hidden mines which could have been removed. It is ironic that the maintenance of the ban will also mean exposing to danger the peacekeeping forces under the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The Security Council must not squander an opportunity for enhancing its credibility. It is time to lift the embargo and save lives.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Abdulmejid **Hussein**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/55/730–S/2001/24

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 164
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to refer to the letter dated 3 January 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to you (A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7). In that letter, the Permanent Observer of Palestine asserts "that the Palestinian side remains opposed to any terrorist actions" and "does not condone any of the actions" referred to in my letter dated 2 January 2001 addressed to you (A/55/725-S/2001/2). Indeed, this statement appears to conform with the spirit of Chairman Arafat's 1993 commitment to renounce the use of terrorism and other acts of violence. At the same time, however, the Permanent Observer of Palestine states that actions perpetrated against Jewish residents of the territories under negotiations are "the complete responsibility" of Israel. This ambiguous, indeed conflicting, language, as well as the distinction between some victims of terrorism and others, amounts, in effect, to condoning acts of terrorism.

I would like to recall that the terrorist attack near the town of Ofra, referred to in my letter, resulted not only in the murder of a Jewish couple, but also in serious injuries inflicted upon five of their six children who were in the car at the time that it was ambushed.

Regrettably, this is not the first time that the Permanent Observer of Palestine has expressed what amounts to an effort to legitimize terrorism. Following the horrible lynching of two Israeli soldiers by a Palestinian mob in the town of Ramallah on 12 October 2000, he made the following remarks to Reuters: "The amount of anger ... frustration ... pain is beyond belief. The Palestinian people, we believe, have the right to feel that way and it is absolutely understood for them to react in a way that probably is not acceptable under normal circumstances" (Reuters, 12 October 2000).

In his historic letter of 9 September 1993 addressed to the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Chairman Arafat stated, inter alia, that "the Palestine Liberation Organization renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all Palestine Liberation Organization elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline

01-20656 (E) 090101

violators". This commitment constitutes a basic principle of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It must be emphasized that Chairman Arafat's commitment was made without distinction with regard to territory. That is to say, he renounced terrorism unequivocally, not only in certain areas as the Permanent Observer of Palestine now implies. Moreover, terrorist attacks have been perpetrated not only in territories under Oslo negotiations, but in recent weeks inside Israeli cities as well, in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Hadera and Netanya.

Therefore, any statements of a nature that violate this commitment, such as the one made by the Permanent Observer of Palestine, undermine the very foundation of the peace process.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 164, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/25

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 9 January 2001 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the communiqué from the current Presidency of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) concerning the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

I should be grateful if you would have this information brought to the attention of Security Council members and have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Moctar **Ouane**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-20683 (E) 090101 090101

Annex to the letter dated 9 January 2001 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations

Communiqué from the current Presidency of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) concerning the situation in Côte d'Ivoire

The current President of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Alpha Oumar Konaré, concerned by the events that have just taken place in Côte d'Ivoire, reaffirms his faith in the political settlement of all disputes and strongly condemns any form of the assumption of power by force.

Democratic process and strict respect for these exigencies are and remain, among the essential conditions for the safeguarding of peace and social stability, which constitute guarantees for harmonious development within ECOWAS.

Koulouba, 8 January 2001

United Nations S/2001/26

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 9 January 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 22 December 2000, from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the communication to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-20784 (E) 100101

Annex

Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

I would be grateful if you could arrange to transmit to the President of the Security Council the attached letter (see enclosure) informing the Security Council of the intention of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct a safeguards inspection in Iraq in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Iraq and IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **ElBaradei**

Enclosure

Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

As I reported to the Security Council in my letter of 10 December 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has dual legal obligations with respect to verification in Iraq: those arising from the safeguards agreement concluded between Iraq and IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter referred to as "the NPT Safeguards Agreement") and those arising under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant Security Council resolutions.

During the time IAEA was able to perform its mandate in Iraq pursuant to the above resolutions, the activities to be carried out by it in Iraq pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement were subsumed under the more comprehensive and intrusive activities pursuant to the Security Council resolutions. Since 15 December 1998, however, IAEA has been unable to carry out its Security Council-mandated activities in Iraq.

In accordance with the IAEA safeguards system, IAEA is required to carry out a physical inventory verification ("PIV") of the remaining nuclear material in Iraq once every calendar year, but in any case not less frequently than every 14 months. The last PIV was completed on 25 January 2000. In view of the IAEA's inability to date to resume verification activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions and implement as part of those activities its obligations under the NPT Safeguards Agreement, IAEA intends to carry out another PIV in January 2001.

While all weapons-usable nuclear material (i.e. all plutonium and highly enriched uranium) has been removed from Iraq in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the nuclear material remaining in Iraq includes a significant amount of low enriched and natural uranium. This material needs to be verified to ensure that it has been, and remains, accounted for, unaltered, under IAEA seal.

I would like to stress again that such verification would have the limited objective of verifying the declared nuclear material in question. It would not, and could not, serve as a substitute for IAEA activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions, which are essential if IAEA is to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council under those resolutions and to provide the necessary assurances sought by the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **ElBaradei**

United Nations S/2001/27

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 10 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to you from Mr. Seyoum Mesfin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdulmejid **Hussein**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-20793 (E) 100101

Annex to the letter dated 10 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you concerning developments in Somalia that are now becoming a source of concern for us in Ethiopia. I am writing to you at this time because I thought that all concerned, most particularly the United Nations, should be alerted to certain potential dangers in Somalia which should be contained before they get out of hand. I am referring here, Mr. President, among other things, to the statement by the BBC on 8 January 2001, which is attributed to Mr. Ali Khalif Galayr, Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government of Somalia. The Prime Minister is credited with having criticized Ethiopia for interfering in the affairs of Somalia.

This is both saddening and a source of concern for Ethiopia. It is saddening because the people within the Transitional National Government should be the first to know how much Ethiopia has done to help the people of Somalia achieve national reconciliation and establish a broad-based Government.

We are not, however, very much surprised over this latest development. It has been clear for us for some time that what the Transitional National Government considers a priority is not bringing about national reconciliation in Somalia through dialogue. What the Transitional Government has appeared to consider a priority is rather securing the submission of those who were not part of the Arta process through whatever means available, including force and through cultivating international legitimacy and recognition. The officials of the Transitional National Government have, as a consequence, appeared very little interested in the creation of domestic legitimacy and consensus. I am not sure whether all of us have done enough to prevail upon the Transitional National Government to exercise wisdom and prudence in this regard.

The entire diplomatic activity of the Transitional National Government has therefore been geared towards soliciting money and support for vanquishing those who have not yet joined the Arta process, but who happen to have established peace and security in their respective regions. We do not believe that the 10-year-old conflict in Somalia can be solved through reliance solely on support from outside.

This approach being used by the Transitional National Government to subdue those who have not accepted its authority within the country is now being used against the neighbours of Somalia that have raised some concerns with regard to the policy pursued by the Transitional National Government. The statement by the Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government from Djibouti is with little doubt designed to make Ethiopia a scapegoat for the difficulties faced by his Government inside the country. Accordingly, it appears that the Transitional National Government is hoping that by blaming Ethiopia for the weaknesses within the Transitional National Government, that money would flow into its coffers and that it would also win greater support from the international community. That the Transitional National Government might also be trying to drive a wedge between Ethiopia and some sections of the international community should not be ruled out. This is very dangerous and bears all the hallmarks of a sinister motive. This should not be acceptable to anyone, but even less so to the United Nations.

In fact, in the light of the role that the United Nations had in shepherding the Arta process, it has a much greater responsibility than most for contributing towards the cultivation of common sense and prudence in connection with the peace process in Somalia.

We in Ethiopia believe that there is still great hope for genuine national reconciliation in Somalia and for the establishment of a broad-based government in that country. We feel that all should contribute our level best towards maintaining the momentum created by the Arta Conference. Both the Transitional National Government and those who were not part of the Arta process have great responsibility in this regard. This is also what was agreed upon at the summit of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) which was convened in Khartoum recently. It is only through dialogue that national reconciliation can be achieved in Somalia. This is what should be reiterated to the Transitional National Government and its representatives. The officials of the Transitional National Government will not advance the interest of Somalia by attacking those who refuse to encourage them to follow a path which will be unlikely to lead either to national reconciliation in Somalia or to peace in that country, or in the subregion in general. Moreover, countries of the subregion such as Ethiopia have legitimate right to respond to real, and not just perceived, threats to their national security. The Transitional National Government cannot be allowed to entertain the illusion that those who have legitimate national security concerns can be forced and bulldozed into silence by the threats of negative international public opinion. This illusion is potentially dangerous and could lead the Transitional National Government to be more and more reckless.

It is my hope that this will not happen and that the officials of the Transitional National Government may be persuaded to be more realistic than they have been lately. They should be told to resist the temptation of creating artificial enemies for purely political purposes with the view to making up for their internal weaknesses. What is needed on their part is to address those weaknesses in a realistic manner. What is also needed is to act in accordance with what is in the interest of Somalia, and the rest of the countries of the subregion.

There is real hope for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. This is an opportunity that the Transitional National Government, together with those who are not now on speaking terms with it, should seize to bring to an end the agony of the people of Somalia. But this can be done only when the Transitional National Government ceases trying to create artificial enemies — a necessity felt by the Transitional National Government because of its outside orientation in the search for support of all sorts, including support for political legitimacy. The Transitional National Government should return its orientation back to Somalia and focus on what needs to be done domestically. This is also in the interest of our subregion. It is my hope that we can count on your support and the support of the Security Council to this end.

(*Signed*) Seyoum **Mesfin**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2001/28

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith as an annex to this letter the cases of violations by Iraq of the terms of the ceasefire between the two countries from 23 January 2000 until 16 May 2000.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hadi **Nejad-Hosseinian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-20828 (E) 110101

Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

A. Ceasefire violations

1. On 30 March 2000, at 1200 hours, a cream-painted Iraqi patrol boat carrying three military passengers was spotted patrolling at the 39R TP 35000-59400 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

2. On 30 March 2000, at 1700 hours, an Iraqi patrol boat carrying two armed passengers dressed in civilian clothes was spotted patrolling at the 39R TP/TN 60500-17000 coordinates of the Alishir map.

3. On 7 April 2000, at 1330 hours, seven black-painted tents were erected at the 38S NC 46000-77000 coordinates of the Sizdah map and 15 to 20 Iraqi soldiers were stationed and three Toyota pick-ups were parked inside the tents.

4. On 22 February 2000, at 0930 hours, Iraqi forces dug an embankment at the 38S QA 29400-82500 coordinates of the Nahre-Anbar map.

5. On 21 February 2000, Iraqi forces set up two anti-artillery guns in the vicinity of Fakkeh area at the 38S QA 48500-50100, 49700-50100 coordinates of the Yabis map.

6. On 15 April 2000, at 2245 hours, through 0300 hours on 16 April 2000, Iraqi forces fired onto territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the 38S ND 67000-31000, 68000-24000 coordinates of the Qasre-shirin map.

7. On 21 April 2000, at 1330 hours, a patrol boat belonging to the Iraqi intelligence service carrying three Iraqi soldiers was spotted patrolling at the 39 R TP 30000-59000 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

8. On 21 April 2000, at 1730 hours, five Iraqi soldiers encountered Iranian forces one kilometre from Salmankoshteh outpost at the 38S NC 49000-53000 coordinates of the Soumar map and with the support of the Iraqi troops stationed at Iraqi Al-Thamoud outpost, fired onto territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was returned by Iranian forces. This exchange of fire continued for 20 minutes.

9. On 23 April 2000, Iraqi forces fired one mortar shell at 2140 hours and two mortar shells at 1930 hours from the Al-Thamoud outpost at the 38S NC 47000-54500 coordinates of the Soumar map on the right side of the Salmankoshteh outpost on territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

10. On 26 April 2000, at 1050 hours, an anti-artillery gun was set up by Iraqi forces at the 38S NC 51000-97000 coordinates of the Kharratha map.

11. On 1 May 2000, at 1245 hours, three Iraqi civilians were spotted erecting a tent at the 39R TP/TN 59000-17000 coordinates of the Alishir map.

12. On 29 March 2000, at 1600 hours, an anti-artillery gun was set up by Iraqi forces at the 38S PA/PB 86000-04000 coordinates of the Chaye-Qhareh tappeh map.

13. On 28 April and 2 May 2000, two bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the 38R QA 69000-20500 coordinates of the Chazzabeh map.

14. On 5 May 2000, from 0900 to 1130 hours, an Iraqi power shovel was spotted at work at the 38S QA 20000-90000 coordinates of the Nahre-anbar map.

15. On 16 May 2000, at 0830 hours, one Iraqi construction vehicle, one lift truck and one Toyota pick-up carrying five passengers were spotted excavating at the 38R QV 08000-31000 coordinates of the Qharbe-Jofeir 2 map. On the same day, at 1500 hours, the same people returned to the Iraqi territory without their equipment.

16. On 27 April 2000, one Iraqi construction vehicle and two lift trucks were spotted excavating at the 39R TP 33000-57600 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

17. On 16 May 2000, at 0900 hours, Iraqi forces set up a machine-gun on the roof of the Alkeramah outpost at the 38R QA 66800-24600 coordinates of the Chazzabeh map.

B. Border incidents

1. On 8 February 2000, at 1830 hours, an Iraqi civilian named Ismaeil Hamid from Chaharkelav, who had illegally entered the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the vicinity of Havan outpost, at the 38S ND 63000-41000 coordinates of the Qhasre-shirin map, was arrested by Iranian forces.

2. On 23 January 2000, at 0530 hours, Iraqi forces planted a booby trap at the 38S QA 32200-80000 coordinates of the Nahre-anbar map.

3. On 11 February 2000, at 0300 hours, Iraqi forces planted a number of booby traps at the 38S QA 374000-85700 coordinates of the Eineh-khosh map.

4. On 21 April 2000, at 0430 hours, three Iraqi nationals (one of them named Qhasem Khalaf Moshari) who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran were arrested by Iranian forces at the 39R TQ 18000-09000 coordinates of the Hosseinieh map.

5. On 21 April 2000, at 1430 hours, two Iraqi nationals named Kazim Alboghdar and Sarhan Harb Ghalim, who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, were arrested by Iranian forces at the 39R TP TQ 15000-97000 coordinates of the Navad map.

6. On 28 April 2000, at 1500 hours, two Iraqi nationals named Rahim Matouri Khorassani and Mohammad Maliki, who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, were arrested by Iranian forces at the 39R TP 29600-67700 coordinates of the Khorramshahr map.

7. On 7 May 2000, an Iraqi national named Jabbar Obour, who lacked identification papers and intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was arrested by Iranian forces at the 38R QV QA 76000-16000 coordinates of the Saidieh map.

8. On 10 May 2000, at 2330 hours, an Iraqi civilian named Mehdi Bagher Majid Alzary, aged 40, from the city of Helleh, who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was arrested by Iranian forces at the 38S NC ND 43000-07000 coordinates of the Khosravi map.

9. On 15 May 2000, at 2245 hours, an Iraqi national named Souran Kamal Saied, who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the 38S ND 57000-22000 coordinates of the Qhasre-shirin map, was arrested by Iranian forces.

10. On 16 May 2000, at 1000 hours, an Iraqi civilian named Abbas Qhatrani, who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the 38S ND 68000-24000 coordinates of the Qhasre-shirin map, was arrested by Iranian forces.

11. On 9 May 2000, a team of three M.K.O. members (two of them, named Said Hassan Bashar and Abdolnabi Halil Mesgar, Iraqis) who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran from inside Iraq were arrested by Iranian forces at the 38R QV 7000-35000 coordinates of the Gharbe-Jofeir map.

12. On 20 May 2000, at 1330 hours, an Iraqi national named Mostafa Sa'ad, who intended to illegally enter the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was arrested by Iranian forces at the 39R TQ 15000-86000 coordinates of the Navad map.

United Nations S/2001/29

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 10 January 2001 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that Mr. Frederick Chiluba, President of the Republic of Zambia, and Mr. Laurent Désiré Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, met on Thursday, 4 January 2001 at Ndola, Republic of Zambia.

The two heads of State held fruitful talks on issues of a bilateral nature.

They also proceeded to a broad survey of the situation along the common frontiers arising out of the offensive still being waged by Rwanda in the Congolese province of Katanga, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000 and 1332 (2000) of 14 December 2000, as well as of the various regional agreements which that country has nevertheless freely signed.

My Government condemns the attitude of Rwanda, which, with the aim of carrying out its irredentist designs on the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has tried to involve the sister Republic of Zambia in the war of aggression that Rwanda has been waging for more than three years against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government, which welcomes the neutrality clearly displayed by the Republic of Zambia, emphasizes its firm intention of combating all the manoeuvres of Rwanda and the negative forces aimed at undermining the excellence of the relations that have for many years united the Republic of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The heads of State have decided to strengthen their relations of good neighbourliness, guided in this by the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

In conclusion, my Government, which reaffirms its confidence in President Frederick Chiluba, invites the Security Council to support his initiatives and efforts with a view to the restoration of a lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

01-20805 (E) 100101 100101

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ileka** Atoki
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2001/30

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 10 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit, annexed hereto, the text of an address made at Kinshasa on Wednesday, 10 January 2001 by His Excellency Mr. Léonard She Okitundu, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, to the diplomatic corps accredited in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The content of this address, which concerns the historic meeting of 9 January 2001 at Libreville (Gabonese Republic) between the protagonists of the Burundian crisis, is an additional demonstration of the unshakeable desire of His Excellency President Laurent Désiré Kabila to give unstinting support to the peace process in the Republic of Burundi as initiated at Arusha, as well as my Government's constant concern to ensure peace, stability and security in the Great Lakes subregion.

My Government believes that the solution of the crisis in Burundi is an essential and inseparable element of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, bearing in mind the disastrous consequences of Burundi's ethnic conflicts in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government therefore welcomes the commitment by His Excellency President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi to withdraw his troops from Congolese territory and calls upon the Security Council to support the Burundian head of State in this commendable effort.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter, and its annex, circulated as a Security Council document.

(*Signed*) Atoki **Ileka**
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-20834 (E) 110101 110101

Annex to the letter dated 10 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Address by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to the diplomatic corps accredited in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

10 January 2001

Your Excellency, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen Ambassadors,
Distinguished guests,

First of all, it is my agreeable duty to express sincere appreciation to you for having responded in such large number to my invitation today.

It is a great honour for me to offer you my very best wishes for this new year, and above all for this new millennium which, we all hope, will be less conflict-ridden, less cruel, and more humane than the previous millennium.

Having planned to receive you in the very near future in order to inform you about the new foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in general, and the peace process in particular, it was on an exceptional basis, in view of the pressing nature of the situation, that I took the liberty, on behalf of the Government of National Salvation, to invite you here today in order to brief you on the historic meeting which was held at Libreville on 9 January 2001 between the protagonists of the Burundian crisis.

On the strength of the geostrategic importance of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Central Africa, and considering that a policy of good-neighbourliness is one of the basic pillars of its foreign policy, along with a deep commitment to peace, His Excellency Mzee Laurent-Désiré Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has seen fit to offer his good offices in the context of the resolution of the Burundian crisis.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, anxious to ensure peace, stability and security in the Great Lakes subregion, has decided to support the efforts of the international community in the Arusha peace process, in view of the lack of active involvement of the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD).

The meeting at Libreville between the President of the Republic of Burundi, Mr. Pierre Buyoya, and colonel Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, coordinator-general of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD)/FDD, under the auspices of the Gabonese head of State, His Excellency Mr. El Hadj Omar Bongo, and his counterpart in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, His Excellency Mzee Laurent-Désiré Kabila, took place at a time of resurgence in our countries of the military activities of aggressor States, among which is Burundi.

Your Excellency, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen Ambassadors,
Distinguished guests,

The Government of National Salvation, at the urging of the President of the Republic, has never made any secret of its intentions to contribute to the maximum extent to the restoration of peace, both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the border countries, including those which are occupying a significant part of our territory.

The Arusha Agreement on "Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi", signed with great pomp on 28 August 2000 by the belligerents in the Burundian crisis, and facilitated by the South African President Mr. Nelson Mandela, has not fully met the expectations of the Burundian people.

What seemed to be the beginning of a genuine process that would lead to lasting peace rapidly turned into a jumble of intentions and measures, making the Agreement almost impossible to implement.

It was for that reason that the Burundi donors, meeting at Paris, determined that the full release of aid to the peace process, estimated at about $400 million, would be conditional upon the effective implementation of the above-mentioned Agreement.

It was in this context that the need arose for the personal involvement of the Congolese head of State in the Arusha peace process, as well as direct contacts between the Burundian President and the leader of FDD.

On that occasion, Minister Didier Mumengi delivered a message from the head of State concerning the need for the restoration of peace in Burundi in view of the repercussions of that country's conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

However, we deplored the absence of the key protagonists of the Burundian conflict, particularly the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) which, in the absence of sufficient guarantees and certain prior conditions, had not been able to sit at the negotiating table.

It should be noted, in this respect, that the current crisis in Burundi goes back to the unfortunate events of 1993 and 1994.

Since then, Burundi has been caught in a terrible spiral of violence which the Arusha Agreement was unable to stop, and this situation has had an impact on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It was at the request of President Pierre Buyoya that the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mzee Laurent-Désiré Kabila, exerted all his influence for the Libreville meeting to take place. It should be stressed, in this respect, that the Abuja meeting of 23 December 2000 between the two heads of State was a decisive factor.

Following this summit meeting, two principles were identified, namely:

- A meeting between the FDD leader, Mr. Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, and the Burundian President;
- The search for ways and means to achieve a peaceful settlement of the war of aggression of which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a victim, taking into account the clear involvement of Burundi.

Your Excellency, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen Ambassadors,
Distinguished guests,

The historic meeting at Libreville, initiated by the head of State Mzee Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was an important and decisive stage in reactivating the Arusha peace process, which will continue to be facilitated by His Excellency Mr. Nelson Mandela.

As may be noted, this is a crucial contribution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which for a long time was unjustly considered as a major obstacle to the achievement of peace in Burundi.

Since it was being alleged that the borders were insecure because the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was being used as a rear base for hostile forces, including forces opposed to the authority of Bujumbura, the Government of National Salvation could not take a passive view of Burundi's security concerns.

Thus, the head of State spared no effort to persuade the leader of FDD, despite his extreme reluctance to sit at the same table as President Buyoya.

Indeed, the impasse in the Arusha peace process was overcome through the personal involvement of the Congolese head of State, who was able to bring together the Burundian protagonists, with the invaluable assistance of the Gabonese President, His Excellency Mr. El Hadj Omar Bongo.

The latter demonstrated, once again, his experience and wisdom in the area of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The outcome of the Libreville meeting was as follows:

1. A determination among the Burundians to find a peaceful solution to their crisis;

2. Agreement on the points of discussion and on the need for a meeting in the near future in order to establish a timetable.

This diplomatic advance will definitely have a positive impact on the solution of the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, since the Burundian President has undertaken to withdraw his troops from Congolese territory.

The resolution of the crisis in Burundi is an essential and inseparable element of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in view of the disastrous consequences of Burundi's ethnic conflicts on our territory.

The Congolese and Burundian ministers of defence are now in Nairobi to study the practical modalities for the withdrawal of the Burundian troops and the armed elements of FDD which are believed to be based in Congolese territory.

Your Excellency, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen Ambassadors,
Distinguished guests,

May I remind the international community which you all represent here that, setting aside legalistic formalities and legal niceties, the belligerents can always opt for dialogue and direct contact, when other structures make this possible, in order to promote a stalled peace process.

The Government of National Salvation appeals to the international community to support this peace process in order to prevent extremists of all kinds from sabotaging this positive initiative, and in particular to obtain security guarantees for the FDD elements which have just demonstrated their good faith in direct talks with the Bujumbura regime, negatively regarded by others.

The Burundian authorities should therefore proceed to dismantle all the concentration camps and release all the political prisoners.

I thank you.

United Nations

S/2001/31

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 9 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 8 January 2001 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, conveying the Government of Iraq's condemnation of the continuing violations of Iraq's territory and airspace by Turkish armed forces and of the entry of such forces into northern Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Al-Humaimidi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-20851 (E) 110101 110101

Identical letters dated 9 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I should like hereunder to draw your attention to the fact that Turkish armed forces supported by fighter aircraft and helicopters have again engaged in aggression against northern Iraq and have participated in fresh hostilities.

1. On 15 December 2000, a Turkish helicopter landed in the Jiwar Qurnah area with four Turkish army commanders and one civilian person on board. They met there with the criminal Jalal Talibani, and as they were leaving they were joined by the criminal Kosrat Rasul.

2. On 16 December 2000, 600 Turkish troops armed with weapons of all types entered the northern region by way of Ibrahim al-Khalil. They took up positions in the Jiwar Qurnah area near Raniyah to assist the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) against elements hostile to that group.

3. On the night of 17/18 December 2000, Turkish special forces and armoured units entered the northern region by way of the Khabur river. They took the road leading to Koysanjaq to join up with the Turkish units already positioned there.

4. On 18 December 2000, 12 Turkish trucks towing heavy howitzers entered the northern region and headed towards Raniyah and Qal'at Dizah to assist the PUK.

5. The number of Turkish troops entering the northern part of the country on 16, 17 and 18 December 2000 was 3,000, and they deployed in the Jiwar Qurnah and Raniyah areas.

6. In the period indicated in paragraph 5 above, a total of 300 Turkish vehicles carrying military equipment of all kinds entered the northern region at different times. They were positioned near the areas of friction between the PUK and elements hostile to that group.

7. The Turkish forces are concentrated in the Khawakurak, Diyana and Koysanjaq sectors, and Turkish aircraft are reconnoitring the positions of the elements hostile to the PUK in the Qal'at Dizah, Raniyah and Qindil sectors.

8. The Turkish officers overseeing combat operations between the PUK and the elements hostile to the group in the Raniyah area are establishing their own position there in addition to the position they have in Koysanjaq.

9. The purpose of the entry of Turkish forces into the northern part of the country and of the preparations they are making in the northern region is to launch a large-scale assault on the Raniyah and Qal'at Dizah areas, where the hostile elements are to be found following the failure of the PUK group in the most recent battles.

This continuation of Turkey's unwarranted aggression is the latest in a series of recurring assaults by its forces on Iraq's territorial integrity, and it coincides with the hostile military actions being perpetrated against the country on a daily basis by the United States of America and the United Kingdom using aircraft based in Turkish, Kuwaiti and Saudi territory.

The ongoing series of hostile operations and the flagrant violations of Iraq's territory and airspace that are being committed by the Turkish armed forces only confirm Iraq's repeated warnings against the consequences of the duplicitous policy being pursued by Turkey vis-à-vis the anomalous situation in northern Iraq and against Turkey's participation in perpetuating that situation by open interference in the internal affairs of Iraq.

The Government of Iraq condemns and deplores in the strongest terms the ongoing violation of Iraq's territory and airspace by the Turkish armed forces, which is incompatible with the principles of good-neighbourliness as well as those embodied in international law and the Charter of the United Nations. It categorically rejects the flimsy arguments and pretexts by which Turkey seeks to justify its military incursions into northern Iraq. The alleged pursuit of elements that pose a threat to Turkey's national security cannot legitimize its continued pursuit of this policy, one that is entirely at odds with its declared commitment to Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Turkey's distress is basically due to the anomalous situation in the area that was imposed by the United States and the United Kingdom acting in cooperation with the Government of Turkey itself.

As it condemns and deplores the ongoing Turkish aggression in the strongest terms, the Government of Iraq calls upon the Turkish Government to desist forthwith from these unwarranted hostile practices and to withdraw its invading forces from Iraqi territory without delay. It further calls upon the Turkish Government to refrain from any repetition of hostile acts that are incompatible with the principles of good-neighbourliness and those embodied in international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

The Government of Iraq reserves in full its right to determine a time and a place to respond to these bellicose actions, and it affirms the right of the Republic of Iraq, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, to ensure that Turkey bears full international responsibility for the consequences of its continuing aggression, its violations of Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity and its exposure of Iraq's security to the gravest risks.

As I express the hope that the United Nations will fulfil its responsibilities as stipulated in the Charter and will prevent any continuation of Turkish aggression, I ask you to do your utmost to urge the Turkish Government to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law by ceasing its military aggression and its interference in Iraq's internal affairs and by withdrawing its armed forces from Iraq's territory forthwith.

(*Signed*) Mohammed Said **Al-Sahaf**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq

United Nations S/2001/32

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 9 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you hereunder the particulars of the latest act of piracy and aggression perpetrated by United States forces stationed in the Arabian Gulf region.

On 12 December 2000, the vessel *Al-Ammar*, owned by the Iraqi businessman Abd al-Salam al-Basrawi, was the target of an unsuccessful attempt at piracy by United States forces stationed in the Arabian Gulf. They were unable to open the vessel's hatches, and when it tried to effect an escape an explosion in its engines killed two seamen. A third seaman, a Sudanese national, was badly burnt.

These repeated acts of piracy by United States naval forces stationed in the Arabian Gulf region are in violation of international law and custom, and they pose a serious threat to international peace and security.

I request you to intervene with the Government of the United States of America with a view to inducing it to desist forthwith from these hostile practices. In accordance with the principle of international responsibility, I also affirm the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to claim compensation for the damage done to it and to its nationals by these acts of aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Al-Humaimidi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations

A/ES-10/55–S/2001/33

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 10 January 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

In follow-up of my previous letters to you, dated from 29 September 2000 to 3 January 2001 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/41-S/2000/1046; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1215; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; and A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7), it is my regret to inform you that the Israeli occupying forces have continued to shoot and kill Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. Since my last letter to you on 3 January, seven Palestinians have been killed, bringing the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli occupying forces to a total of 329 martyrs. (The names of the seven martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.)

The Palestinian civilians who have been killed by the soldiers of the occupying Power, and sometimes by Israeli settlers, have been killed on roads, at checkpoints, in their cars, and even in their own homes. Among the Palestinians martyred in recent days, were two young Palestinian women. One woman, aged 18 years, was killed in her home in Al-Khalil (Hebron) by Israeli bullets. The young woman's cousin, also a woman aged 18 years, who was in the house as well, was wounded by the live ammunition. Another Palestinian woman, aged 20 years, was killed by Israeli bullets fired at the car in which she was riding on a road near the town of Nablus. Also in Al-Khalil, a Palestinian man, who had been handcuffed at an Israeli roadblock, was shot by Israeli soldiers. Gaza was also witness to fatal violence during the past week when a 70-year-old Palestinian man was shot and killed.

Although the Government of Israel maintains that its occupying forces do not shoot at Palestinian civilians unless the lives of soldiers are threatened, the killings

prove that this assertion is completely false. Moreover, as noted in my previous letters, Israel, the occupying Power, clearly pursues a policy of assassination of identified Palestinian civilians, a fact stated by several high-ranking Israeli officials. As such, the occupying Power is obviously engaged, inter alia, in the wilful killing of civilians, in grave violation of international law and international humanitarian law. Indeed, many of the practices of the Israeli occupying forces are tantamount to war crimes against the Palestinian people. Such continuous killing and destruction by the occupying Power are grave reminders of the need for immediate action by the international community to assist and protect Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 10 January 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli security forces in the Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem (Friday, 5 January through Tuesday, 9 January 2001)

Friday, 5 January 2001

1. Mohammed Mahmoud Abu Hassira
2. Areej Saber Al-Jabali (18 years old)

Sunday, 7 January 2001

Fatma Jalal Abu Jeish

Monday, 8 January 2001

1. Abdel Hamid Ahmed Al-Kharty
2. Mohammed Ahmed Sowf

Tuesday, 9 January 2001

1. Abdel Hameed Abdel Raheem Khanfar
2. Ibrahim Hussein Abu Mughaiseb

United Nations S/2001/34

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 January 2001

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, including resolutions 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995, 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, 1147 (1998) of 13 January 1998, 1183 (1998) of 15 July 1998, 1222 (1999) of 15 January 1999, 1252 (1999) of 15 July 1999, 1285 (2000) of 13 January 2000, 1305 (2000) of 21 June 2000 and 1307 (2000) of 13 July 2000,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 29 December (S/2000/1251) on the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP),

Recalling also the letters to its President from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 22 December 2000 (S/2000/1235) and from the Permanent Representative of Croatia of 5 January 2001 (S/2001/13), concerning the disputed issue of Prevlaka,

Reaffirming once again its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders,

Noting once again that the Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 30 September 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in particular articles 1 and 3 thereof, the latter reaffirming their agreement concerning the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula,

Noting with satisfaction that the overall situation in the UNMOP area of responsibility has remained stable and calm,

Reiterating its concern about continuing violations of the demilitarization regime, including limitations placed on the free movement of United Nations military observers,

Noting with satisfaction that the opening of crossing points between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the demilitarized zone continues to facilitate civilian and commercial traffic in both directions without security incidents and continues to represent a significant confidence-building measure in the normalization of relations between the two parties, and urging the parties to utilize these openings as a basis for further confidence-building measures to achieve the normalization of relations between them,

Welcoming the commitment of the democratic governments of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as expressed by the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S/2000/1235) and the Foreign Minister of Croatia (S/2001/13), to resume as soon as possible bilateral talks on the disputed issue of Prevlaka pursuant to the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 23 August 1996 (S/1996/706, annex), which would end a long period during which no substantive progress was made on the issue,

Expressing its concern over the delay in putting in place a comprehensive demining programme by the parties,

Commending the role played by UNMOP, and noting also that the presence of the United Nations military observers continues to be essential to maintaining conditions that are conducive to a negotiated settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and of Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 and the statement of its President of 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/4),

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

1. *Authorizes* the United Nations military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula, in accordance with resolutions 779 (1992) and 981 (1995) and paragraphs 19 and 20 of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1028), until 15 July 2001;

2. *Reiterates* its calls upon the parties to cease all violations of the demilitarized regime in the United Nations designated zones, to take steps further to reduce tension and to improve safety and security in the area, to cooperate fully with the United Nations military observers and to ensure their safety and full and unrestricted freedom of movement;

3. *Calls* on the parties to resume talks on the disputed issue of Prevlaka as soon as possible and encourages them to make use of the recommendations and options to develop confidence-building measures with which they were provided pursuant to its request in resolution 1252 (1999) with a view to, inter alia, further facilitating the freedom of movement of the civilian population, and requests the Secretary-General to report by 15 April 2001;

4. *Urges once again* that parties abide by their mutual commitments and implement fully the Agreement on Normalization of Relations, and stresses in particular the urgent need for them to fulfil rapidly and in good faith their commitment to reach a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka in accordance with article 4 of that Agreement;

5. *Requests* the parties to continue to report at least bi-monthly to the Secretary-General on the status of their bilateral negotiations;

6. *Reiterates* its call upon the parties to put a comprehensive demining programme in place in the identified minefields in the UNMOP area of responsibility;

7. *Requests* the United Nations military observers and the multinational stabilization force authorized by the Council in resolution 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996 and extended by resolution 1305 (2000) of 21 June 2000 to cooperate fully with each other;

8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.